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PROOF LENGTHS FOR INSTANCES OF THE
PARIS-HARRINGTON PRINCIPLE
ANTON FREUND
Abstract. As Paris and Harrington have famously shown, Peano Arithmetic
does not prove that for all numbers k,m, n there is an N which satisfies the
statement PH(k,m, n,N): For any k-colouring of its n-element subsets the
set {0, . . . , N − 1} has a large homogeneous subset of size ≥ m. At the same
time very weak theories can establish the Σ1-statement ∃N PH(k,m, n,N) for
any fixed parameters k,m, n. Which theory, then, does it take to formalize
natural proofs of these instances? It is known that ∀m∃N PH(k,m, n,N) has
a natural and short proof (relative to n and k) by Σn−1-induction. In con-
trast, we show that there is an elementary function e such that any proof of
∃N PH(e(n), n+ 1, n,N) by Σn−2-induction is ridiculously long.
In order to establish this result on proof lengths we give a computational ana-
lysis of slow provability, a notion introduced by Sy-David Friedman, Rathjen
and Weiermann. We will see that slow uniform Σ1-reflection is related to a
function that has a considerably lower growth rate than Fε0 but dominates all
functions Fα with α < ε0 in the fast-growing hierarchy.
We recall some terminology from [PH77]: For a set X and a natural number n
we write [X ]n for the collection of subsets of X with precisely n elements. Given
a function f with domain [X ]n, a subset Y of X is called homogeneous for f if
the restriction of f to the set [Y ]n is constant. A non-empty subset of N is called
large if its cardinality is at least as big as its minimal element. Where the context
suggests it we use N to denote the set {0, . . . , N − 1}. Then the Paris-Harrington
Principle, or Strengthened Finite Ramsey Theorem, expresses that for all natural
numbers k,m, n there is an N such that the following statement holds:
PH(k,m, n,N) :≡
“for any function [N ]n → k the set N has a large
homogeneous subset with at least m elements”
Using the methods presented in [HP93, Section I.1(b)] it is easy to formalize the
statement PH(k,m, n,N) in the language of first order arithmetic, as a formula that
is ∆1 in the theory IΣ1 of Σ1-induction. The celebrated result of [PH77] says that
the formula ∀k,m,n∃N PH(k,m, n,N) is true but unprovable in Peano Arithmetic.
As is well-known, any true Σ1-formula in the language of first-order arithmetic can
be proved in a theory as weak as Robinson Arithmetic. It is thus pointless to ask
whether a Σ1-sentence is provable in a sound arithmetical theory, in contrast to the
situation for Π1-sentences (cf. Go¨del’s Theorems) and Π2-sentences (provably total
functions). What we can sensibly ask is whether a Σ1-sentence has a proof with
some additional property. The present paper explores this question for instances
∃N PH(k,m, n,N) of the Paris-Harrington Principle. Our principal result states
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that, for some elementary function e, the following holds:
(1)
For sufficiently large n, no proof of the formula ∃N PH(e(n), n+ 1, n,N)
in the theory IΣn−2 can have Go¨del number smaller than Fε0 (n− 3).
If we replace IΣn−2 by IΣn−3 (and Fε0(n− 3) by Fε0 (n− 4)) then we can take the
constant function e(n) = 8. It is open whether we can make e constant and keep
the stronger fragment IΣn−2.
Recall that Fε0 is the function at stage ε0 of the fast-growing hierarchy. Ketonen
and Solovay in [KS81] have related it to the function that maps (k,m, n) to the
smallest witness N which makes the statement PH(k,m, n,N) true. A classical
result due to Kreisel, Wainer and Schwichtenberg [Kre52, Wai70, Sch71] says that
Fε0 eventually dominates any provably total function of Peano Arithmetic. Similar
to (1) we will show that the Σ1-formula ∃y Fε0(n) = y has no short proof in the
theory IΣn.
By [HP93, Theorem II.1.9] the formula ∀m∃N PH(k,m, n,N) is provable in IΣn−1,
for each fixed n ≥ 2 and k. The proofs of these instances formalize perfectly
natural mathematical arguments. According to [HP93, Section II.2(c)] they can be
constructed in the meta-theory IΣ1. Since all provably total functions of IΣ1 are
primitive recursive, this complements (1) by the following statement:
(2)
There is a primitive recursive function which maps (k, n) with n ≥ 2 to
a proof of the formula ∀m∃N PH(k,m, n,N) in the theory IΣn−1.
Similarly, a primitive recursive construction yields proofs of ∃y Fε0(n) = y in the
theories IΣn+1: In view of Fε0(x) ≃ Fωx+1(x) = Fωx+1x (x) it suffices to prove the
statements “Fωn+1n is total”. This is done by Π2-induction up to ω
n+1
n , which is
available in IΣn+1 by Gentzen’s classical construction (cf. [FW98, Theorem 4.11]).
We argue that (1) is not only a result about proof length, but also about the
existence of natural proofs: Observe first that we are concerned with sequences pn
of proofs for a sequence of parametrized statements An, rather than with a single
proof of a single statement. Under which conditions can such a sequence of proofs
follow an intelligible uniform proof idea? It is the role of the proofs pn to guarantee
that the formulas An are true. On the other hand the statement “the given proof
idea leads to formally correct proofs pn of the statements An” should, we believe,
be justified by fairly elementary means. Since elementary means cannot prove the
totality of functions with a high growth rate this implies that the function mapping
n to (a code of) the proof pn cannot grow too fast. In this sense (1) shows that
IΣn−2-proofs of the Paris-Harrington Principle for arity n and e(n) colours cannot
follow a natural proof idea. The author sees no formal condition which would,
on the positive side, ensure that a sequence of proofs is natural. On an informal
level the construction which establishes [HP93, Theorem II.1.9] appears to provide
natural IΣn−1-proofs of the statements ∀m∃N PH(k,m, n,N).
Let us briefly discuss connections with a line of research initiated by Harvey
Friedman: Theorem 15 in [Smi85] says that any proof of a certain Σ01-statement in
the theory Π12-BI0 must have at least 21000 (i.e. 1000 iterated exponentials to the
base 2) symbols. Obviously this goes much further than our result insofar as it in-
volves a much stronger theory. However, there is also a more conceptual difference:
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Friedman’s statement can, in principle, be verified explicitly (by looking at all pos-
sible proofs with less than 21000 symbols) and is thus finitistically meaningful. In
contrast, our statement (1) involves an unbounded existential quantifier, implicit
in the phrase “sufficiently large”. It is conceivable that any witness to this existen-
tial quantifier is so huge that statement (1) does not have “practical significance”.
On the other hand the more abstract form of (1) has the important advantage of
making the statement more robust: A result like [Smi85, Theorem 15] requires con-
crete numerical bounds which might depend on the formalization and are difficult
to establish in full detail. To prove claim (1), on the other hand, we can rely on the
more robust concept of growth rates. How exactly we arithmetize the relation “p
codes a proof of the statement with Go¨del number ϕ in the theory IΣn” will not
matter. All we require is that this relation is defined by an arithmetical formula
ProofIΣn(p, ϕ) (with parameters n, p and ϕ) which is ∆1 in the theory IΣ1 and
IΣ1-provably equivalent to the usual formalizations of provability. Statement (1)
is true for any such arithmetization; merely the concrete meaning of “sufficiently
large” may change (cf. Remark 1.4 below). Another interesting comparison is with
a result of Kraj´ıcˇek [Kra89, Theorem 6.1]: He considers Π2-instances of the Paris-
Harrington Principle and establishes linear bounds on the number of steps in proofs
in full Peano Arithmetic (rather than in restricted fragments).
To conclude this introduction, let us summarize the different sections of the
paper: In Section 1 we show how the analysis of reflection leads to lower bounds
on proof sizes. Given a theory T, the uniform reflection principle for the formula
∃yϕ(x, y) expresses that “for all p and n there is an N such that if p is a T-proof of
∃yϕ(n, y) then ϕ(n,N) is true”. If we have a bound on the provably total functions
of reflection then we know that the witness N cannot be too much bigger than the
code of the proof p. Vice versa p cannot be too small if ∃yϕ(n, y) has only large
witnesses. We suppose that this line of argumentation is known (it occurs e.g. in
[HMP93]), but the author knows of no article that would develop it in general form.
The method just described applies to sequences of proofs in a single theory T, while
statement (1) is concerned with a sequence of proofs that may contain axioms from
increasingly strong theories. This discrepancy is resolved in Section 2: We consider
a notion of “slow proof” in Peano Arithmetic, deduced from the slow consistency
statement introduced by Sy-David Friedman, Rathjen and Weiermann in [FRW13].
The idea is to penalize complex induction axioms by a drastic increase in proof size.
This generates an interplay between proof length and the use of induction. At the
same time it makes the construction of proofs more difficult, thus weakening the
reflection and consistency statement. We can then apply the method of Section 1
to show that any slow PA-proof of ∃N PH(e(n+ 2), n+ 3, n+ 2, N) must be long.
Claim (1) will easily follow.
The results of Section 2 rely on certain bounds on the provably total functions of
slow reflection. The proof of these bounds follows in Section 3. There we relate slow
uniform Σ1-reflection to a “slow variant” F
⋄
ε0
of the function Fε0 . We will see that
each function Fα with α < ε0 is dominated by F
⋄
ε0
while F ⋄ε0 itself grows much slower
than Fε0 . This computational analysis of slow reflection is complemented by the
results of [Fre16], where we investigate the consistency strength (Π1-consequences)
of slow reflection. Further results on slow provability can be found in [HP16].
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1. Bounding Proof Sizes via Reflection Principles
In this section we show how bounds on the provably total functions of uniform
Σ1-reflection lead to lower bounds on the sizes of proofs. To formulate the reflection
principle we will need a Σ1-formula TrueΣ1(ϕ) that defines truth for Σ1-formulas
(in the large sense, i.e. the formula may start with several existential quantifiers).
The theory IΣ1 should be able to prove Tarski’s truth conditions (as guaranteed
by [HP93, Theorem I.1.75]). With respect to the proof predicate we must develop
the theory in some generality:
Definition 1.1. A proof predicate is a Π1-formula Proof(p, ϕ) in the language of
first-order arithmetic, with only the variables p and ϕ free. Given a proof predicate
we have the associated Σ1-reflection principle
RFNΣ1 :≡ ∀ϕ(“ϕ is a closed Σ1-formula”∧ ∃p Proof(p, ϕ)→ TrueΣ1(ϕ)).
For a natural number p and a formula ϕ with Go¨del number pϕq we say that “p is
a proof of ϕ” if the formula Proof(p, pϕq) is true in the standard model.
The following observation is easy but crucial:
Lemma 1.2. Let Proof(p, ϕ) be a proof predicate, and let T be a sound extension
of IΣ1 that proves the Σ1-reflection principle associated with Proof(p, ϕ). For any
Σ1-formula ψ(x, y) there is a T-provably total function g : N
2 → N such that
ψ(n, g(p, n)) is true whenever p is a proof of ∃yψ(n, y).
Note that, since T must be sound, the lemma can only be applied to proof
predicates which are themselves sound for Σ1-formulas.
Proof. Since the theory T extends IΣ1 it is strong enough to handle Feferman’s dot
notation, and it proves the “It’s snowing”-Lemma (see [HP93, Corollary I.1.76]).
Combining this with the reflection principle for Proof(p, x) we obtain
T ⊢ ∀x(∃p Proof(p, p∃yψ(x˙, y)q)→ ∃yψ(x, y)).
Prefixing quantifiers transforms this into
T ⊢ ∀p,x∃y(Proof(p, p∃yψ(x˙, y)q)→ ψ(x, y)).
We remark that it is only mildly non-constructive to prefix the existential quantifier
in the consequent: A computation of the witness y will use the proof p but rather
not the computational content of the statement Proof(p, p∃yψ(x˙, y)q). In any case
the formula Proof(p, p∃yψ(x˙, y)q) → ψ(x, y) is Σ1 in IΣ1. As we have seen the
theory T shows that this formula defines a left-total relation. To obtain a single-
valued function we apply a standard minimization argument. Note that we cannot
simply pick the minimal value for y since this would yield a function with a ∆2-
graph; instead we simultaneously minimize over y and the witness to the existential
quantifier implicit in Proof(p, p∃yψ(x˙, y)q)→ ψ(x, y). This results in a Σ1-formula
χ(p, x, y) such that we have
T ⊢ ∀p,x,y(χ(p, x, y)→ (Proof(p, p∃yψ(x˙, y)q)→ ψ(x, y)))
and T ⊢ ∀x,p∃!yχ(p, x, y). Since T is sound the formula χ(p, x, y) does indeed define
a T-provably total function g : N2 → N, which satisfies N  χ(p, n, g(p, n)) for all
natural numbers p and n. By the above we also have
N  Proof(p, p∃yψ(n, y)q)→ ψ(n, g(p, n)) for all p, n ∈ N.
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Lifting the implication to the meta-language gives the desired claim. 
We can deduce the promised lower bound on proof sizes:
Proposition 1.3. Let Proof(p, ϕ) be a proof predicate, and let T be a sound ex-
tension of IΣ1 that proves the Σ1-reflection principle for Proof(p, ϕ). Consider a
Σ1-formula ψ(x, y) and define a function Fψ : N→ N ∪ {∞} by setting
Fψ(n) :=
{
m if m is the least number for which ψ(n,m) is true,
∞ if ∃yψ(n, y) is false.
Let f : N→ N be a function with f(n) ≥ n and such that, whenever g is T-provably
total, the function g ◦ f is eventually dominated by Fψ (considering ∞ as bigger
than any natural number). Then there is a bound N such that we have
p > f(n) whenever p is a proof of ∃yψ(n, y) with n ≥ N.
To avoid misunderstanding, we stress that the notion of proof in the last line of
the proposition is induced by the proof predicate in the first line, via Definition 1.1.
Proof. Let g : N2 → N be the function provided by Lemma 1.2. We can make g
monotone in both arguments: First define g0 : N
2 → N by the primitive recursion
g0(p, 0) := g(p, 0),
g0(p, n+ 1) := max{g(p, n+ 1), g0(p, n)}.
This yields g0(p, n) ≥ g(p, n) for all numbers p and n, as well as g0(p, n) ≤ g0(p, n
′)
whenever we have n ≤ n′. Now define g1 : N
2 → N by setting
g1(0, n) := g0(0, n),
g1(p+ 1, n) := max{g0(p+ 1, n), g1(p, n)}.
It is obvious that we have g1(p, n) ≥ g0(p, n) ≥ g(p, n) for all numbers p and n,
and that p ≤ p′ implies g1(p, n) ≤ g1(p
′, n). By induction on p one can also show
that g1(p, n) ≤ g1(p, n
′) holds whenever we have n ≤ n′. Lemma 1.2 implies that
we have
Fψ(n) ≤ g1(p, n) whenever p is a proof of ∃yψ(n, y).
Since the theory T extends IΣ1 its provably total functions are closed under prim-
itive recursion, by [HP93, Theorem I.1.54]. Thus g1 is still T-provably total. We
define another T-provably total function g△ : N→ N, diagonalizing over g1, as
g△(p) := g1(p, p) + 1.
By assumption there is a bound N such that we have
(g△ ◦ f)(n) ≤ Fψ(n) for all n ≥ N.
Let us show that the same bound N satisfies the claim of the proposition: Consider
an arbitrary n ≥ N and assume that p is a proof of the formula ∃yψ(n, y). Aiming
at a contradiction we assume p ≤ f(n). Then we have
Fψ(n) ≤ g1(p, n) ≤ g1(f(n), f(n)) < (g
△ ◦ f)(n) ≤ Fψ(n),
which is indeed absurd. 
It is a nice property of the proposition that the bounds it establishes are invariant
under basic transformations of proofs:
6 ANTON FREUND
Remark 1.4. If f satisfies the conditions of the proposition and h is T-provably
total (e.g. primitive recursive) with h(p) ≥ p then h ◦ f satisfies these conditions
as well. Thus proofs of ∃yψ(n, y) will even be bigger than h(f(n)) for all n above
some (possibly increased) bound.
This is useful because it allows us to preprocess proofs: Consider a modified notion
proof′ and a sequence of formulas ϕn, not necessarily of the form ϕ(n) and not
necessarily in the syntactic class Σ1. Assume that there is a Σ1-formula ψ(x, y)
and a primitive recursive function h which transforms any proof′ of ϕn into (an
upper bound for) a proof of ∃yψ(n, y). Possibly increasing h we can assume that h
is monotone and satisfies h(p) ≥ p. Using the proposition we may be able to show
that p > h(f(n)) holds whenever p is a proof of ∃yψ(n, y), with n sufficiently large.
We want to deduce q > f(n) where q is a proof′ of ϕn. Indeed, q ≤ f(n) would
imply h(q) ≤ h(f(n)). This would mean that there exists a proof of ∃yψ(n, y)
below h(f(n)), which we have seen to be false. The proof of Lemma 2.6 contains a
detailed application of this argument.
To conclude this section we illustrate what a simple application of the proposition
can yield. Adopting the notation from [KS81] we have
σ(n, k) = min{N | PH(k, n+ 1, n,N) is true},
i.e. the number σ(n, k) is the smallest witness for the Paris-Harrington Principle
with arity n and k colours. We know from [PH77, Theorem 3.2] that the function
n 7→ σ(n, n) eventually dominates any provably total function of Peano Arithmetic.
The following result on proof sizes is considerably weaker than (1), insofar as it
speaks about fixed fragments of Peano Arithmetic.
Corollary 1.5. For any number k the (total) function
n 7→ “the smallest Go¨del number of a proof of the
Σ1-formula ∃N PH(n, n+ 1, n,N) by Σk-induction”
eventually dominates any provably total function of Peano Arithmetic.
Proof. Let f be an arbitrary PA-provably total function. Assume that f(n) ≥ n
holds for all n, possibly after replacing f by the function n 7→ max{f(n), n}. We
apply Proposition 1.3 to the usual proof predicate ProofIΣk(p, ϕ) for the theory of
Σk-induction (or rather to a Π1-formula that is equivalent to ProofIΣk(p, ϕ) over
IΣ1), to the theory T = PA, to the formula ψ(x, y) ≡ PH(x, x + 1, x, y), and
to the function f . Then n 7→ σ(n, n) is the function Fψ of Proposition 1.3. The
assumptions of the proposition are satisfied: It is well known that Peano Arithmetic
proves uniform Σ1-reflection for the theory IΣk (see e.g. [HP93, Corollary I.4.34]).
For any PA-provably total function g the composition g ◦ f is PA-provably total
as well, and thus indeed dominated by n 7→ σ(n, n). The result of Proposition 1.3
is nothing but the claim of the corollary. 
The bound of the corollary is reasonably accurate, in the sense that the function
computing the minimal proofs is not much faster than the provably total func-
tions of Peano Arithmetic: Recall that PH(k,m, n,N) is ∆1 in IΣ1. Thus not
only σ(n, n) itself but the witnesses to all unbounded quantifiers of the Σ1-formula
∃N PH(n, n+1, n,N) are bounded by a primitive recursive function in n and σ(n, n).
Furthermore, the Σ1-completeness theorem is established by a primitive recursive
construction of proofs. Thus there is a primitive recursive function h : N2 → N
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such that h(n, σ(n, n)) is the Go¨del number of a proof of ∃N PH(n, n+ 1, n,N) in
the theory IΣ0.
2. No Short Proofs for Instances of the Paris-Harrington Principle
In this section we refine Corollary 1.5 by varying k alongside with n. On first
sight it may seem astonishing that Proposition 1.3, which only deals with one proof
predicate at a time, can be used to this effect. We will see, however, that a single
proof predicate can inform us about proofs in various theories: The slow PA-proofs
that we will introduce penalize the use of complex induction axioms by a drastic
increase in proof length, thus creating an interplay between proof length and the
amount of induction used in the proof.
Before we can define the notion of a slow proof we need some preliminaries on
ordinal notations and the fast-growing hierarchy of functions. Ordinal notations
are required for the ordinals below ε0, the smallest fixed point of the function
α 7→ ωα. As usual they will be based on the Cantor normal form
α = ωα1 · n1 + · · ·+ ω
αk · nk with k ∈ N, ni ∈ N\{0} and α1 > · · · > αk.
Crucially, α < ε0 implies α1 < α so that the Cantor normal form inductively yields
finite term notations. Basic ordinal arithmetic can be translated into syntactic
operations on these terms. The operations are sufficiently elementary to make
ordinal arithmetic available in the theory IΣ1, after arithmetization of the finite
term syntax. In fact, Sommer in [Som95, Sections 2 and 3] shows that theories
much weaker than IΣ1 suffice if one encodes the terms efficiently. In this paper we
are not interested in very weak theories, but it is nevertheless convenient to adopt
the encoding of Sommer: This allows us to use his ∆0-definition of the functions in
the fast-growing hierarchy.
We remark that the ordinal arithmetic of [Som95] includes fundamental sequences:
The fundamental sequence ({α}(n))n∈N of a limit ordinal α is a strictly increasing
sequence of ordinals with supremum α. Precisely, any limit ordinal α can uniquely
be written as α = β + ωγ · (k + 1) where γ > 0 is the smallest exponent of the
Cantor normal form of α, and β contains the larger summands. We then have
{β + ωγ · (k + 1)}(n) = β + ωγ · k + ωδ · (n+ 1) if γ = δ + 1,
{β + ωγ · (k + 1)}(n) = β + ωγ · k + ω{γ}(n) if γ is a limit.
For zero and successor ordinals one sets {0}(n) := 0 and {β + 1}(0) := β.
Next, consider the “stack of ω’s”-function defined by the recursion
ωα0 = α, ω
α
n+1 = ω
ωα
n .
As usual, ωn abbreviates ω
1
n. This function is not part of the ordinal arithmetic
encoded by Sommer (although it is, of course, part of his meta-theory). Since
Sommer does encode the function α 7→ ωα it is immediate to make the function
(n, α) 7→ ωαn (operating on the codes) available in IΣ1. However, we will need more,
namely a ∆0-formula defining the graph and explicit bounds on the values of this
function. Write pαq for the term notation of α, represented as a list with digits from
{1, . . . , 4} as in [Som95]. Then ωαn is represented by the following concatenation of
lists:
pωαnq = 〈4, . . . , 4︸ ︷︷ ︸
n characters 4
〉⌢pαq⌢〈3, 1, . . . , 3, 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n alternations
〉
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Indeed, with each character 4 we move to the exponent of the leftmost summand of
the Cantor normal form, while 3 instructs us to leave the exponent and look at the
corresponding coefficient, which in the present case is always 1 (represented by the
base two notation of 1, which happens to be the list 〈1〉 itself). Now to verify the
relation ωαn = β we only have to compare digits in the sequence representations of
α and β, and this can be cast into a ∆0-formula (see [Som95, Section 2.2]). Using
[Som95, Proposition 2.1], which relates the code of a list of digits to its length, we
can also establish the following inequality between the codes of α and ωαn :
(3) IΣ1 ⊢ ∀n,α ω
α
n ≤ 4
3n+1 · (α+ 1).
Let us remark that we do not extend the ordinal notation system by a symbol for
ε0, in order to keep it closed under the usual operations of ordinal arithmetic. By a
harmless abuse of notation we will sometimes refer to the “fundamental sequence”
of ε0, which we define as {ε0}(n) := ωn+1.
Using fundamental sequences we can define the fast-growing hierarchy of functions
indexed by ordinals below and including ε0. The definition varies slightly within
the literature; our version differs from the classic [Wai70, Sch71] and coincides e.g.
with [Som95]:
F0(x) := x+ 1,
Fα+1(x) := F
x+1
α (x),
Fλ(x) := F{λ}(x)(x) for λ a limit ordinal.
Here and in the following an exponent to a function symbol denotes the number of
times the function is to be iterated. Given an arithmetization of ordinal arithmetic
it is easy to define the graph of (α, x, i) 7→ F iα(x) by a Σ1-formula in the language of
first-order arithmetic: As described in [Som90, Section 4.1] one can compute F iα(x)
by simplifying expressions of the form F i1α1(F
i2
α2
(· · · (F ikαk(z)) · · · )), so one only needs
to state the existence of such a computation sequence. What is remarkable is that
the size of an (improved) computation sequence can be bounded by a polynomial
in the value of F iα(x). This is worked out in [Som90, Appendix A] (see also the
less detailed [Som95, Section 5.2]) and leads to a ∆0-formula F
i
α(x) = y with
free variables x, y, α, i which defines the functions Fα for α < ε0, as well as their
iterations. By [Som95, Theorem 5.3] the defining equations of the fast-growing
hierarchy are provable in IΣ1 (under the assumption that the involved computations
terminate, which is of course unprovable in IΣ1). As Sommer only encodes the
hierarchy below ε0 we should show separately that the formula
Fε0(x) = y :≡ ∃α(α = ωx+1 ∧ Fα(x) = y)
is ∆0 in IΣ1: The only task is to bound the existentially quantified α. By [FRW13,
Lemma 2.3, Proposition 2.12] the inequalities
Fωx+1(x) ≥ Fω(x) ≥ F2(x) = 2
x+1 · (x+ 1)− 1 ≥ 2x+1 for x ≥ 1
are provable in IΣ1. Combining this with (3) we obtain
(4) IΣ1 ⊢ x ≥ 1 → (Fε0 (x) = y ↔ ∃α≤y6·4·(p1q+1)(α = ωx+1 ∧ Fα(x) = y)),
where p1q denotes the code of the ordinal 1.
Writing 〈·, ·〉 for the Cantor pairing function with projections pi1(·), pi1(·) we can
now define slow proofs in Peano Arithmetic. The idea is to penalize the use of
PROOF LENGTHS FOR INSTANCES OF THE PARIS-HARRINGTON PRINCIPLE 9
complex induction axioms by a drastic increase in proof length, and thus to create
an interplay between proof size and the amount of induction used in the proof.
Definition 2.1 (cf. [FRW13]). A pair 〈q,N〉 is a slow PA-proof of a formula ϕ if
there is a number n such that we have N = Fε0(n) and such that q codes a (usual)
proof of ϕ in the theory IΣn+1. This notion is defined by the formula
Proof⋄
PA
(p, ϕ) :≡ ∃x(ProofIΣx+1(pi1(p), ϕ) ∧ Fε0(x) = pi2(p)),
which is ∆1 in IΣ1 since by [Som95, Proposition 5.4] the second conjunct implies
the bound x ≤ pi2(p).
For a formula F (x) = y let us abbreviate ∃yF (x) = y by F (x) ↓. Also, we
write PrIΣx(ϕ) for the formula ∃p ProofIΣx(p, ϕ). It is easy to see that the slow
provability predicate
Pr⋄PA(ϕ) :≡ ∃p Proof
⋄
PA(p, ϕ)
satisfies the equivalence
IΣ1 ⊢ Pr
⋄
PA
(ϕ)↔ ∃x(PrIΣx+1(ϕ) ∧ Fε0 (x)↓).
The slow uniform Σ1-reflection principle
RFN⋄Σ1(PA) :≡ ∀ϕ(“ϕ is a closed Σ1-formula”∧ Pr
⋄
PA(ϕ)→ TrueΣ1(ϕ))
and the slow consistency statement
Con⋄(PA) :≡ ¬Pr⋄
PA
(p0 = 1q)
can be characterized as
(5) IΣ1 ⊢ RFN
⋄
Σ1(PA)↔ ∀x(Fε0 (x)↓→ RFNΣ1(IΣx+1))
and
IΣ1 ⊢ Con
⋄(PA)↔ ∀x(Fε0(x)↓→ Con(IΣx+1)).
As the last equivalence reveals the notion of slow PA-proof comes from the article
[FRW13] by S.-D. Friedman, Rathjen and Weiermann: These authors introduce the
slow consistency statement
Con∗(PA) ≡ ∀x(Fε0 (x)↓→ Con(IΣx))
and show that we have
(6) PA+Con∗(PA) 0 Con(PA).
It has been pointed out by Michael Rathjen [Rat] that slow provability satisfies
the Go¨del-Lo¨b conditions, provably so in IΣ1. In many respects it thus behaves as
the usual provability predicate for Peano Arithmetic. The index shift between our
Con⋄(PA) and the formula Con∗(PA) of [FRW13] has been introduced to improve
the bounds on proof sizes that we are about to establish.
The central ingredient to our bounds on proof sizes is a computational analysis of
slow reflection. Since this analysis is independent and somewhat technical we defer
it to Section 3 below. In the present section we will only use the following result of
this analysis:
Theorem 3.10. For any provably total function g of PA + RFN⋄Σ1(PA) there is
a number N such that we have
g(Fε0(n
.− 1)) ≤ Fε0(n) for all n ≥ N.
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In particular any provably total function of the theory PA + RFN⋄Σ1(PA) is even-
tually dominated by Fε0 .
The reader who prefers to see all proofs in order may go through Section 3
now and return to this point afterwards. In the rest of this section we show how
results about proof sizes in fragments of Peano Arithmetic can be deduced. It
is worth observing that a weaker version of Theorem 3.10 suffices for these ap-
plications: Namely, it would be enough to bound the provably total functions of
IΣ1+RFN
⋄
Σ1(PA) rather than those of PA+RFN
⋄
Σ1(PA). However, as a result in
its own right Theorem 3.10 is certainly more satisfying with the stronger base the-
ory. Let us now investigate the size of proofs of the formulas Fε0 (n)↓. Afterwards
we will come to the slightly more subtle case of the Paris-Harrington Principle:
Lemma 2.2. There is a number N such that we have
p > 〈Fε0(n
.− 1), Fε0(n
.− 1)〉 for any slow PA-proof p of Fε0(n)↓ with n ≥ N.
To avoid misunderstanding we recall that 〈·, ·〉 denotes the Cantor pairing.
Proof. We apply Proposition 1.3 to the proof predicate Proof⋄
PA
(p, ϕ), the theory
T = IΣ1 + RFN
⋄
Σ1(PA), the formula ψ(x, y) ≡ Fε0 (x) = y (so that Fψ is the
function Fε0), and the function n 7→ 〈Fε0 (n
.− 1), Fε0(n
.− 1)〉 at the place of f . Let
us verify the assumptions of Proposition 1.3: By (5) we have
IΣ1 +RFNΣ1(PA) ⊢ RFN
⋄
Σ1(PA),
where RFNΣ1(PA) denotes the usual uniform Σ1-reflection principle for Peano
Arithmetic. This shows that the theory IΣ1 + RFN
⋄
Σ1(PA) is sound. Next, using
[KS81, Proposition 2.5] we have
n ≤ Fε0(n
.− 1) ≤ 〈Fε0 (n
.− 1), Fε0(n
.− 1)〉.
Finally, consider an arbitrary function g that is provably total in the theory IΣ1 +
RFN⋄Σ1(PA). We have to show that there is a number N such that we have
g(〈Fε0(n
.− 1), Fε0(n
.− 1)〉) ≤ Fε0(n) for all n ≥ N.
This follows from Theorem 3.10, applied not to g itself but rather to the function
m 7→ g(〈m,m〉), which is still provably total in the theory IΣ1+RFN
⋄
Σ1(PA). Now
Proposition 1.3 gives us precisely the claim. 
It is easy to deduce bounds for proofs in the fragments of Peano Arithmetic:
Theorem 2.3. There is a number N such that for all n ≥ N no proof of the
statement Fε0 (n)↓ in the theory IΣn can have code less than or equal to Fε0(n
.−1).
Proof. We can assume that the bound N in Lemma 2.2 is bigger than zero. Let us
show that the present result holds with the same bound: Aiming at a contradiction,
suppose that q ≤ Fε0 (n
.−1) is an IΣn-proof of the formula Fε0 (n)↓, for some n ≥ N .
By definition 〈q, Fε0(n
.− 1)〉 is a slow PA-proof of Fε0(n)↓. Thus the inequality
〈q, Fε0 (n
.− 1)〉 ≤ 〈Fε0 (n
.− 1), Fε0(n
.− 1)〉
contradicts Lemma 2.2. 
To deduce corresponding results for instances of the Paris-Harrington Principle,
recall the function (n, k) 7→ σ(n, k) defined just before Corollary 1.5 above. We
need to link this function to the function Fε0 :
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Lemma 2.4 ([KS81]). We have
Fε0(n) ≤ σ(n+ 2, 10
35n2) ≤ σ(n+ 3, 8) for all n ≥ 15.
Proof. This is the result of [KS81, Lemma 3.6, Theorem 3.10], except that [KS81]
works with a slightly different version of fundamental sequences, setting
{β + ωγ · (k + 1)}(n) = β + ωγ · k + ωδ · n in case γ = δ + 1.
With this definition, descending to the n-th member of the fundamental sequence
can introduce a coefficient (bounded by) n. In our case the new coefficients are
bounded by n+ 1. The overall bound σ(n+ 2, 1023n
2
) of [KS81, Lemma 3.6] then
increases to our σ(n+ 2, 1035n
2
).
Let us describe the concrete changes that are necessary (the reader will have to
consult [KS81] for context): First, the bound of [KS81, Proposition 2.9] increases
from |Tk,c,n| ≤ (n+1)
c
k to |Tk,c,n| ≤ (n+2)
c
k. At the same time the rather generous
bound |Tk,c,n| ≤ 2
(n6c)
k−1 of [KS81, Proposition 2.10] remains valid without change.
Thus [KS81, Lemma 3.1] remains valid, and so does [KS81, Lemma 3.2.1]. A
small change is required in [KS81, Lemma 3.2.2]: We need to weaken the condition
g(x0, . . . , xn−1) ≤ x0 to g(x0, . . . , xn−1) ≤ x0+1. It is easy to see that g is then con-
trolled by an (n+1, 105)-algebra (instead of an (n+1, 104)-algebra). Consequently,
[KS81, Lemma 3.2.3] now constructs an (n+ 1, 105c)-algebra. One can check that
[KS81, Lemma 3.4] remains valid in spite of the prior changes: The bound of [KS81,
Lemma 3.2.3] is still strong enough for the base case of the proof; in the step, the
bound is generous enough to accomodate the fact that G3 is now an (n + 2, 10
5)-
algebra. It follows that [KS81, Theorem 3.5] remains unchanged: For n, k ≥ 1 the
function Fωk
n
is captured by an (n + 2, 10n·(12n+2k+8))-algebra. Parallel to [KS81,
Lemma 3.6] we can now deduce the desired bound: We have {ωn+1}(n) = ω
n+1
n and
thus Fε0 (n) = Fωn+1(n) = Fωn+1n (n) (as opposed to Fε0 (n) = Fωnn (n) in the original
[KS81, Lemma 3.6]). Let G0 be an (n+2, 10
14n2+20n)-algebra that captures Fωn+1n .
Let G1 be an (n + 2, 7)-algebra such that min(S) ≥ 2n + 3 holds whenever S is
suitable for G1. In view of
7 · 1014n
2+20n ≤ 1014n
2+20n+1 ≤ 1035n
2
(for n ≥ 1)
we can choose an (n + 2, 1035n
2
)-algebra G which simulates G0 and G1. If S is
suitable for G then we have
max(S) ≥ s2 > s1 ≥ Fωn+1n (s0) ≥ Fωn+1n (n) = Fε0 (n).
This means that the restriction
G ↾[Fε0(n)]n+2: [Fε0 (n)]
n+2 → 1035n
2
admits no suitable set. Thus we have Fε0(n) < σ(n+ 2, 10
35n2).
It remains to check σ(n + 2, 1035n
2
) ≤ σ(n + 3, 8). This is parallel to the proof of
[KS81, Theorem 3.10]: Observe that we have
Fn+13 (n+ 2) ≥ F3(n) ≥ 2
2n ≥ 24·35n
2
≥ 1035n
2
for n ≥ 15.
Thus by [KS81, Lemma 3.9] each (n + 2, 1035n
2
)-algebra can be simulated by an
(n+3, 8)-algebra, and this implies the claim. Note that the condition n ≥ 15 could
easily be replaced by a smaller bound. 
This implies the following result, which we will need in our applications:
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Corollary 2.5. For any provably total function g of IΣ1 +RFN
⋄
Σ1(PA) there is a
number N such that we have
g(Fε0(n
.− 1)) ≤ σ(n+ 2, 1035n
2
) ≤ σ(n+ 3, 8) for all n ≥ N.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 3.10 and Lemma 2.4. 
Similar to Lemma 2.2, slow proofs of certain instances of the Paris-Harrington
Principle must be long:
Lemma 2.6. The following holds:
(a) There is a number K ′ such that we have p > 〈Fε0 (n
.− 1), Fε0(n
.− 1)〉 for
any slow PA-proof p of ∃N PH(1035n
2 , n+ 3, n+ 2, N) with n ≥ K ′.
(b) There is a number K ′ such that we have p > 〈Fε0 (n
.− 1), Fε0(n
.− 1)〉 for
any slow PA-proof p of ∃N PH(8, n+ 4, n+ 3, N) with n ≥ K
′.
Proof. We only show (a). The proof of (b) is similar and somewhat easier. Com-
pared to the proof of Lemma 2.2, the main subtlety is that the formulas
ϕn :≡ ∃N PH(1035n
2 , n+ 3, n+ 2, N)
are not of the form ϕ(n), i.e. parametrized by the n-th numeral. To make Propos-
ition 1.3 applicable we need to preprocess proofs of these formulas, as sketched in
Remark 1.4: Let e(x) = z be a Σ1-formula such that we have
N  e(n) = k ⇔ k = 1035n
2
and IΣ1 ⊢ ∀x∃z e(x) = z. In view of the latter, the witnesses to all unbounded
quantifiers of the Σ1-formula ∃z e(n) = z are bounded by a primitive recursive func-
tion in n. By the proof of Σ1-completeness there is a primitive recursive function
pe : N
2 → N such that pe(n, k) is an IΣk-proof of e(n) = 1035n
2 .
Next, let ψ(x, y) be a Σ1-formula with
(7) IΣ1 ⊢ ψ(x, y)↔ ∃z(e(x) = z ∧ PH(z, x+ 3, x+ 2, y)).
Following Remark 1.4, we need a primitive recursive function h : N → N which
transforms a slow PA-proof of ϕn into a slow PA-proof of ∃yψ(n, y). Let us first
construct a primitive recursive function h′ : N2 → N such that h′(k, q) is an IΣk+1-
proof of ∃yψ(n, y) if q is an IΣk+1-proof of ϕn: Given a proof q as described, we
can read off its end formula ϕn and then the number n. Recall that pe(n, k + 1)
is an IΣk+1-proof of e(n) = 1035n
2 . Combining this with q and introducing an
existential quantifier yields an IΣk+1-proof of
∃z(e(n) = z ∧ ∃N PH(z, n+ 3, n+ 2, N)).
It is not unreasonable to assume that n+ 3 (resp. n+ 2) is the same term as n+3
(resp. n+2). Even if not, there are primitive recursive functions which map a pair
(k, n) to IΣk+1-proofs of n+ 3 = n + 3 and n+ 2 = n + 2. We then apply the
equality axioms and prefix the existentially quantified N , giving an IΣk+1-proof of
∃y∃z(e(n) = z ∧ PH(z, n+ 3, n+ 2, y)).
Invoking the equivalence (7) we get the desired proof h′(k, q) of ∃yψ(n, y). Now
to construct h, assume that p = 〈q,M〉 is a slow PA-proof of ϕn. By definition
there is an m ≤ M such that q is an IΣm+1 proof of ϕn and such that we have
Fε0(m) =M . Recall that the relation Fε0(x) = y is primitive recursively decidable,
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and that Fε0 is strictly monotone. Thus we can primitive recursively determine the
unique m with the stated property. Now it suffices to set
h(p) := 〈h′(m, q),M〉.
We need to increase h to make it monotone and ensure h(p) ≥ p. Clearly, the
increased function still satisfies the following: If p is a slow PA-proof of ϕn then
there is a slow PA-proof of ∃yψ(n, y) below h(p).
Now we apply Proposition 1.3 to the proof predicate Proof⋄
PA
(p, ϕ), the theory
T = IΣ1 + RFN
⋄
Σ1(PA), the Σ1-formula ψ(x, y) defined above, and the function
n 7→ h(〈Fε0(n
.− 1), Fε0(n
.− 1)〉) at the place of f . In view of (7) we have
N  ψ(n,m) ⇔ N  PH(1035n2 , n+ 3, n+ 2,m),
so that Fψ is the function n 7→ σ(n + 2, 10
35n2). Concerning the assumptions of
Proposition 1.3, in view of h(p) ≥ p (see also the proof of Lemma 2.2) we have
h(〈Fε0 (n
.− 1), Fε0(n
.− 1)〉) ≥ n for all n.
Coming to the other assumption, let g be any provably total function of IΣ1 +
RFN⋄Σ1(PA). We must show that n 7→ g(h(〈Fε0 (n
.− 1), Fε0(n
.− 1)〉)) is eventually
dominated by the function n 7→ σ(n+ 2, 1035n
2
). To see this one applies Corollary
2.5 to the function m 7→ g(h(〈m,m〉)), which is still provably total in the theory
IΣ1 + RFN
⋄
Σ1(PA). Having verified the assumptions Proposition 1.3 gives us a
bound K ′ such that we have
p′ > h(〈Fε0 (n
.− 1), Fε0(n
.− 1)〉)
whenever p′ is a slow PA-proof of ∃yψ(n, y) with n ≥ K
′. To deduce the claim of
(a), let p be a slow PA-proof of ∃N PH(1035n
2 , n+ 3, n+ 2, N), still with n ≥ K ′.
As we have seen above, this implies that there is a slow PA-proof of ∃yψ(n, y)
below h(p). By the bound that we have just established we must have
h(p) > h(〈Fε0 (n
.− 1), Fε0(n
.− 1)〉).
Since h is monotone this does indeed imply p > 〈Fε0(n
.− 1), Fε0(n
.− 1)〉. 
We can derive the central result of the paper, claim (1) from the introduction:
Theorem 2.7. The following holds:
(a) There is a number K such that for all n ≥ K no proof of the formula
∃N PH(1035(n
.−2)2 , n+ 1, n,N) in the theory IΣn .−2 can have Go¨del number
less than or equal to Fε0(n
.− 3).
(b) There is a number K such that for all n ≥ K no proof of the formula
∃N PH(8, n+ 1, n,N) in the theory IΣn .−3 can have Go¨del number less than
or equal to Fε0 (n
.− 4).
Proof. We only write out the proof for (a), the proof of (b) being completely
parallel: Let K ′ be the bound from Lemma 2.6, and set K := max{K ′ + 2, 3}.
Consider an arbitrary n ≥ K and a proof q of ∃N PH(1035(n−2)
2 , n+ 1, n,N) in
the theory IΣn−2. It follows that the pair 〈q, Fε0(n − 3)〉 is a slow PA-proof of
∃N PH(1035(n−2)
2 , n+ 1, n,N). Lemma 2.6 yields
〈q, Fε0(n− 3)〉 > 〈Fε0 (n− 3), Fε0(n− 3)〉.
Since the Cantor pairing is monotone we get q > Fε0(n− 3), as desired. 
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By claim (2) from the introduction both ∃N PH(1035(n
.−2)2 , n+ 1, n,N) and
∃N PH(8, n+ 1, n,N) have short proofs in IΣn .−1. The fragment IΣn .−2 in part
(a) of the theorem is thus optimal. Concerning (b), it is currently open whether
∃N PH(8, n+ 1, n,N) has a short proof in IΣn .−2. In any case the parameters of
the Paris-Harrington Principle leave room for variation: For example, the bounds
established by Loebl and Nesˇetrˇil [LN92] (with shorter proofs than in [KS81]) lead
to similar results.
3. The Provably Total Functions of Slow Reflection
The goal of this section is to provide a proof of Theorem 3.10, which we already
used (but did not prove) in the previous section. We will need the following char-
acterization of uniform Σ1-reflection over the fragments of Peano Arithmetic:
Proposition 3.1. We have
IΣ1 ⊢ ∀x(Fωx ↓↔ RFNΣ1(IΣx)).
Proof. It is known that the equivalence Fωn ↓↔ RFNΣ1(IΣn) for fixed n is provable
in IΣ1 (and in weaker theories): A model-theoretic proof can be found in [Par80]
or [Som95, Proposition 6.8]. For a proof-theoretic approach (via iterated reflection
principles) we refer to [Bek03, Theorem 1, Proposition 7.3, Remark 7.4]. The author
has found no fully explicit argument that the formalization is uniform in n. We
provide a detailed proof of this fact in [Fre15]: This is a proof-theoretic argument,
formalizing the infinitary proof system from [BW87] by the method of [Buc91]. 
Using this result and (5) we can view slow reflection as a statement about the
fast-growing hierarchy of functions:
Corollary 3.2. We have
IΣ1 ⊢ RFN
⋄
Σ1(PA) ↔ ∀x(Fε0 (x)↓→ Fωx+1 ↓).
Note that the “index shift”, stemming from the definition of slow proof, is indeed
optimal: In view of Fε0(x) ≃ Fωx+1(x) we can deduce
IΣ1 ⊢ ∀x(Fε0(x)↓→ Fωx+2 ↓) → ∀yFε0(y)↓
by induction on y. Thus a stronger slow reflection statement would collapse into
the usual notion of Σ1-reflection over Peano Arithmetic. This explains why our
bounds on proof size are relatively sharp.
Our next goal is to transform the Π2-statement ∀x(Fε0(x) ↓→ Fωx+1 ↓) into a
formula which defines a unary function.
Definition 3.3. The inverse F−1ε0 of the function Fε0 (see [FRW13, Definition 3.2])
is given by
F−1ε0 (x) := max({z ≤ x | ∃w≤xFε0 (z) = w} ∪ {0}).
Note that the ∆0-definition of Fε0 yields a ∆0-definition of F
−1
ε0
. To define a slow
variant F ⋄ε0 of the function Fε0 we set
F ⋄ε0 (x) := FωF−1ε0 (x)+1
(x),
which has the Σ1-definition
F ⋄ε0(x) = y ⇔ ∃z(z = F
−1
ε0
(x) ∧ ∃α(α = ωz+1 ∧ Fα(x) = y)).
Clearly, z is bounded by x. In view of (4) the code of α is bounded by a polynomial
in x. Thus the given definition of F ⋄ε0 is ∆0 in IΣ1.
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We remark that the idea behind F ⋄ε0 is similar to Simmons’ slow variant of the
Ackermann function in [Sim10, Paragraph 2]. Let us now connect F ⋄ε0 with the slow
reflection principle:
Proposition 3.4. We have
IΣ1 ⊢ RFN
⋄
Σ1(PA)↔ F
⋄
ε0
↓ .
Proof. By Corollary 3.2 the claim of the proposition is equivalent to
IΣ1 ⊢ ∀x(Fε0(x)↓→ Fωx+1 ↓)↔ F
⋄
ε0
↓ .
To show the direction “→” we work in IΣ1 and assume that the formula ∀x(Fε0 (x)↓
→ Fωx+1 ↓) holds. We have to prove F
⋄
ε0
(x) ↓ for an arbitrary x. The finitely
many x < Fε0(0) are treated by Σ1-completeness. For x ≥ Fε0(0) the set {z ≤
x | ∃w≤xFε0 (z) = w} is non-empty, so F
−1
ε0
(x) =: z is an element of this set. In
particular it follows that Fε0 (z) is defined. Then the assumption ∀x(Fε0 (x) ↓→
Fωx+1 ↓) tells us that Fωz+1 is total. Thus Fωz+1(x) is defined, as required for
F ⋄ε0(x)↓.
For the direction “←”, assume that the function F ⋄ε0 is total, let x be arbitrary, and
assume that Fε0(x) is defined. We have to prove that Fωx+1 is total. By [FRW13,
Lemma 2.3] it suffices to show that Fωx+1(y) is defined for arbitrarily large y. Since
Fε0(x) was assumed to be defined, we may consider an arbitrary y above this
value. Then we have x ≤ F−1ε0 (y) =: z. Invoking the totality of F
⋄
ε0
we learn that
F ⋄ε0(y) = Fωz+1(y) is defined. It follows by [FRW13, Lemma 2.4, Proposition 2.12,
Lemma 2.3] that Fωx+1(y) is defined (and has value at most F
⋄
ε0
(y)). 
By the parenthesis at the end of the proof, the function F ⋄ε0 dominates Fωx+1 for
values above Fε0 (x). In other words, F
⋄
ε0
eventually dominates any provably total
function of Peano Arithmetic. In particular we have
PA 0 RFN⋄Σ1(PA).
Since slow reflection implies slow consistency this was already known by [FRW13,
Proposition 3.3]. It is important that the argument we just gave does not formalize
in Peano Arithmetic: To show that F ⋄ε0 dominates Fωx+1 we had to know that
Fε0(x) is defined. If this was different then F
⋄
ε0
↓ would imply Fε0 ↓, contradicting
the result that we are about to prove.
Recall that our goal is to bound the provably total functions of the theory PA +
RFN⋄Σ1(PA), or equivalently those of PA + F
⋄
ε0
↓. It is a classical result that any
provably total function of Peano Arithmetic is dominated by some function Fα with
α < ε0 from the fast-growing hierarchy. To analyse PA+RFN
⋄
Σ1(PA) we build an
analogous hierarchy on top of F ⋄ε0 :
Definition 3.5. By induction on α < ε0 we define functions F
⋄
ε0+α: Set
F ⋄ε0+0(n) := F
⋄
ε0
(n),
F ⋄ε0+α+1(n) := (F
⋄
ε0+α)
n+1(n),
F ⋄ε0+α(n) := F
⋄
ε0+{α}(n)
(n) for α limit,
where the superscript n+ 1 denotes the number of iterations and {α}(n) refers to
the fundamental sequence of α, as defined at the beginning of Section 2.
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To make use of this hierarchy we will need some monotonicity properties. These
will involve the “step down”-relation from [KS81, Section 2] (with slightly different
fundamental sequences) or [FRW13, Section 2]: We write β →n γ to express that
there is a sequence 〈δ0, . . . , δk〉 of ordinals with δ0 = β, δk = γ and {δi}(n) = δi+1
for all i < k. The following properties are familiar from the usual fast-growing
hierarchy:
Lemma 3.6. For all numbers m,n and ordinals α, β < ε0 the following holds:
(i) We have n ≤ n2 < F ⋄ε0+α(n).
(ii) If m ≤ n then F ⋄ε0+α(m) ≤ F
⋄
ε0+α(n).
(iii) If α→n β then F
⋄
ε0+β
(n) ≤ F ⋄ε0+α(n).
Proof. We repeat the well-known proof for the usual fast-growing hierarchy (see
[KS81, Proposition 2.5]), with minor modifications in the base case: Claim (i) is
shown by induction on α. For α = 0 we have
n2 < Fω
F
−1
ε0
(n)+1
(n) = F ⋄ε0(n)
by [Som95, Proposition 5.4]. Successor and limit case are easy. Claims (ii) and (iii)
are shown by a simultaneous induction on α. Concerning α = 0 it is easy to see
that m ≤ n implies F−1ε0 (m) ≤ F
−1
ε0
(n). Then
F ⋄ε0(m) = FωF−1ε0 (m)+1
(m) ≤ Fω
F
−1
ε0
(n)+1
(m) ≤ Fω
F
−1
ε0
(n)+1
(n) = F ⋄ε0(n)
follows by [FRW13, Lemma 2.3, Proposition 2.12]. Claim (iii) is trivial for α = 0.
In case α = γ + 1 claim (ii) holds by
F ⋄ε0+α(m) = (F
⋄
ε0+γ)
m+1(m) ≤ (F ⋄ε0+γ)
m+1(n) ≤
≤ (F ⋄ε0+γ)
n+1(n) = F ⋄ε0+α(n),
due to the induction hypothesis and claim (i). Concerning (iii) note that {α}(n) = γ
forces β = γ or γ →n β. Thus
F ⋄ε0+β(n) ≤ F
⋄
ε0+γ(n) ≤ (F
⋄
ε0+γ)
n+1(n) = F ⋄ε0+α(n)
follows by the induction hypothesis and claim (i). Let us come to (ii) for a limit
ordinal α: By [FRW13, Proposition 2.12] we have {α}(n)→m {α}(m). Then
F ⋄ε0+α(m) = F
⋄
ε0+{α}(m)
(m) ≤ F ⋄ε0+{α}(n)(m) ≤ F
⋄
ε0+{α}(n)
(n) = F ⋄ε0+α(n)
uses the induction hypothesis of both (iii) and (ii). As for (iii), note that α →n β
implies β = {α}(n) or {α}(n)→n β. Thus
F ⋄ε0+β(n) ≤ F
⋄
ε0+{α}(n)
(n) = F ⋄ε0+α(n)
follows from the induction hypothesis. 
To approach Theorem 3.10 we bound the functions F ⋄ε0+α in terms of the usual
fast-growing hierarchy:
Lemma 3.7. Consider numbers l,m, n with m > 0 and an ordinal α ≤ ωm which
satisfy (Fωm+α)
l(n) ≤ Fε0 (m). Then we have
(F ⋄ε0+α)
l(n) ≤ (Fωm+α)
l(n).
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Proof. We argue by transfinite induction on α with a side induction on l. The
base l = 0 of the side induction amounts to the trivial inequality n ≤ n. So
let us come to the side induction step l  l + 1: There we have the assumption
(Fωm+α)
l+1(n) ≤ Fε0 (m). Abbreviating N := (F
⋄
ε0+α)
l(n) our task is to show
F ⋄ε0+α(N) ≤ (Fωm+α)
l+1(n). We will use some well-known monotonicity proper-
ties of the fast-growing hierarchy, which can be found in [FRW13, Section 2] (or
[KS81, Section 2], with slightly different fundamental sequences). For example we
have (Fωm+α)
l(n) < (Fωm+α)
l+1(n), which allows us to apply the side induction
hypothesis and obtain
N ≤ (Fωm+α)
l(n) < Fε0 (m).
Now we distinguish the following cases:
Case α = 0: Let us first show
(8) F−1ε0 (N) + 1 ≤ m.
Aiming at a contradiction, assume that we have m ≤ F−1ε0 (N). Observe that this
implies F−1ε0 (N) > 0. Invoking the definition of F
−1
ε0
we would then get
Fε0(m) ≤ Fε0(F
−1
ε0
(N)) ≤ N,
which contradicts N < Fε0(m) from above. Now in view of (8) we obtain
F ⋄ε0(N) = FωF−1ε0 (N)+1
(N) ≤ Fωm(N) ≤ (Fωm)
l+1(n),
which is the side induction step in the case α = 0.
Case α = β + 1: First observe
(Fωm+β)
N+1(N) = Fωm+α(N) ≤ (Fωm+α)
l+1(n) ≤ Fε0(m).
This allows us to apply the main induction hypothesis with N,N + 1 and β at the
places of n, l and α, respectively. We get
F ⋄ε0+α(N) = (F
⋄
ε0+β)
N+1(N) ≤ (Fωm+β)
N+1(N) =
= Fωm+α(N) ≤ (Fωm+α)
l+1(n).
Case α limit: The condition α ≤ ωm implies ωm + {α}(N) = {ωm + α}(N) (the
ordinal ωm meshes with α, see [FRW13, Section 2]). Then we have
Fωm+{α}(N)(N) = Fωm+α(N) ≤ (Fωm+α)
l+1(n) ≤ Fε0(m).
Now apply the main induction hypothesis with N, 1 and {α}(N) at the places of
n, l and α, to get
F ⋄ε0+α(N) = F
⋄
ε0+{α}(N)
(N) ≤ Fωm+{α}(N)(N) =
= Fωm+α(N) ≤ (Fωm+α)
l+1(n).
We have thus completed the side induction step in all possible cases. 
From the lemma we can deduce the following result, which could be described
as the “combinatorial half” of Theorem 3.10:
Proposition 3.8. For each α < ε0 there is a number N such that we have
F ⋄ε0+α(Fε0(n
.− 1)) ≤ Fε0(n) for all n ≥ N.
In particular F ⋄ε0+α is eventually dominated by Fε0 .
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Proof. Consider some α < ε0. We shall see that the proposition holds for any
N > 0 with ωN →N α + 1. Let us first show that such a number N exists: As a
first approximation take some N0 > 0 with α < ωN0. From [KS81, Lemma 2.6] we
get a number N with ωN0 →N α+1, and by [KS81, Corollary 2.4] we may assume
N ≥ N0. By [FRW13, Proposition 2.12] we have ωN →N ωN0 , and together this
implies ωN →N α + 1 as desired. To verify the proposition consider an arbitrary
number n ≥ N . We would like to apply the previous lemma with n, 1 and Fε0(n−1)
at the places of m, l and n, respectively. To do so we must verify the condition
(9) Fωn+α(Fε0 (n− 1)) ≤ Fε0 (n)
of the lemma. Using [FRW13, Lemma 2.7] we get ωn + α→n ωn, and then
Fωn+α(Fε0(n− 1)) = Fωn+α(Fωn(n− 1)) ≤ Fωn+α(Fωn(n)) ≤
≤ (Fωn+α)
2(n) ≤ (Fωn+α)
n+1(n) = Fωn+α+1(n).
The next step is to show ωn+1 →n ωn + α + 1: From [FRW13, Lemma 2.10, 2.13]
we get ωn+1 →n ω
ωn−1+1. In view of {ωωn−1+1}(1) = ωn+ωn we can use [FRW13,
Proposition 2.12] to obtain ωn+1 →n ωn + ωn. Since ωn meshes with ωn it only
remains to show ωn →n α + 1. This follows from the above ωN →N α + 1 using
[KS81, Corollary 2.4] and [FRW13, Proposition 2.12]. Now we get
Fωn+α+1(n) ≤ Fωn+1(n) = Fε0 (n),
which completes the proof of (9). This allows us to apply the previous lemma, and
we finally obtain
F ⋄ε0+α(Fε0 (n− 1)) ≤ Fωn+α(Fε0 (n− 1)) ≤ Fε0 (n).
To deduce that F ⋄ε0+α is eventually dominated by Fε0 use n ≤ Fε0 (n− 1) and the
fact that F ⋄ε0+α is monotone. 
The previous proposition is complemented by the following result:
Proposition 3.9. Any provably total function of PA+RFN⋄Σ1(PA) is eventually
dominated by one of the functions F ⋄ε0+α with α < ε0.
Proof. By Proposition 3.4 the slow reflection principle RFN⋄Σ1(PA) is equivalent
to the statement that the function F ⋄ε0 is total. It is a classical result that any
provably total function of Peano Arithmetic is eventually dominated by one of the
functions Fα with α < ε0 from the fast-growing hierarchy. We need to see that
this remains valid when one adds the base function F ⋄ε0 (both as an axiom and as
initial function of the fast-growing hierarchy). Indeed a general result to this effect
is shown as part of the proof of [KSPW12, Theorem 16]. However, in [KSPW12]
the approach to the fast-growing hierarchy is somewhat different: The paper works
with norms of ordinals rather than explicit fundamental sequences. This appears
to be a technicality, but rather than working out a detailed comparison we take the
more direct way and reprove [KSPW12, Theorem 16] in our setting:
As basis for our proof we take the analysis of the provably total functions of Peano
Arithmetic in [BW87]. We assume that the reader has access to this paper. Note
that the notation β <k α in [BW87] refers to the same “step down”-relation that
we write as α →k β. First of all we need to extend the formalization of Peano
Arithmetic in [BW87, Section 2] by the axiom F ⋄ε0 ↓. To do so, recall that the graph
of F ⋄ε0 is defined by a ∆0-formula and is thus elementary. So the formal system
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of [BW87, Section 2] already contains a relation symbol F ⋄ε0 (·) = · and defining
axioms corresponding to its elementary definition. Using this relation symbol we
extend the formal system by the new axiom ∀x∃yF
⋄
ε0
(x) = y. Next, we need to
adapt the infinitary proof system of [BW87, Section 3]. This system contains a
special relation symbol · ∈ N which will be interpreted as a finite approximation to
the set of natural numbers. The infinitary system contains an axiom which places
zero in N and a rule which allows us to put in successors:
(N) if ⊢α Γ, n ∈ N then ⊢α+1 Γ, n+ 1 ∈ N .
We need to add a new rule which gives access to values of the function F ⋄ε0 (it is
important that the increase in the ordinal bound is independent of n):
(N⋄) if ⊢α Γ, n ∈ N then ⊢α+1 Γ, F ⋄ε0(n) ∈ N .
Using this rule the embedding lemma is easily extended by a proof of the axiom
∀x∃yF
⋄
ε0
(x) = y in the infinite system: Since the prime formula F ⋄ε0(n) = F
⋄
ε0
(n) is
true we get ⊢1 n /∈ N, F ⋄ε0 (n) = F
⋄
ε0
(n) for each n. The axiom ⊢0 n /∈ N, n ∈ N and
the new rule (N⋄) yield ⊢1 n /∈ N, F ⋄ε0(n) ∈ N. Introducing a conjunction and an
existential quantifier we obtain ⊢3 n /∈ N, ∃y∈NF
⋄
ε0
(n) = y. To keep the coefficients
in the ordinal bound small we now apply accumulation: In view of ω →2 3 we can
conclude ⊢ω n /∈ N, ∃y∈NF
⋄
ε0
(n) = y. By disjunction introduction and the ω-rule
we arrive at ⊢ω+3 ∀x∈N∃y∈NF
⋄
ε0
(x) = y. Using accumulation again we get
⊢ω·2 ∀x∈N∃y∈NF
⋄
ε0
(x) = y,
precisely as needed for the extended embedding lemma. It is straightforward to
check that inversion, reduction and cut-elimination remain valid: In this respect
the new rule (N⋄) behaves just as the original rule (N). In the bounding lemma the
bound Fα(k) is replaced by F
⋄
ε0+α(k):
Assume that we have ⊢α n1 /∈ N, . . . , nr /∈ N,Γ with cut rank 0, where
Γ only contains closed positive Σ1(N)-formulas. Then Γ is true in
F ⋄ε0+α(k) for k = max({2} ∪ {3n1, . . . , 3nr}).
Recall that positive Σ1(N)-formulas only contain the connectives ∨,∧, ∃ and do
not contain subformulas of the form n /∈ N. A closed sequent is called true in m
if the disjunction of its formulas is true under the interpretation N = {n | 3n <
m} of the special relation symbol. To prove the bounding lemma one argues by
induction on α and distinguishes cases according to the last rule of the deduction
⊢α n1 /∈ N, . . . , nr /∈ N,Γ. Using Lemma 3.6 this is straightforward and essentially
as in [BW87]. Let us only consider the case of a deduction that ends in the new
rule (N⋄): Then Γ contains a formula of the form F ⋄ε0(n) ∈ N and we have ⊢
β
n1 /∈ N, . . . , nr /∈ N,Γ, n ∈ N with α = β + 1. Since the premise of the rule
contains no new formula of the form m /∈ N the number k is unchanged and the
induction hypothesis tells us that Γ, n ∈ N is true in F ⋄ε0+β(k). There are two
possibilities: If Γ is true in F ⋄ε0+β(k) then it is also true in F
⋄
ε0+α(k) ≥ F
⋄
ε0+β
(k).
Otherwise the formula n ∈ N must be true in F ⋄ε0+β(k), which means that we have
n ≤ 3n < F ⋄ε0+β(k). Using Lemma 3.6 we observe 3 ≤ (F
⋄
ε0+β
)2(k) and infer
3 · F ⋄ε0(n) ≤ 3 · F
⋄
ε0
(F ⋄ε0+β(k)) ≤ (F
⋄
ε0+β)
2(k) · (F ⋄ε0+β)
2(k) <
< (F ⋄ε0+β)
3(k) ≤ (F ⋄ε0+β)
k+1(k) = F ⋄ε0+α(k).
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This means that Γ contains the formula F ⋄ε0(n) ∈ N which is true in F
⋄
ε0+α(k).
Now we can deduce the desired result as usual: Let g be a provably total function of
the theory PA+F ⋄ε0 ↓. From the given definition of g we can read off an elementary
relation χg such that we have
g(m) = n ⇔ N  ∃zχg(m,n, z),
PA+ F ⋄ε0 ↓ ⊢ ∀x∃y,zχg(x, y, z).
By embedding and cut elimination we get an ordinal α < ε0 and an infinitary
deduction ⊢α ∀x∈N∃y∈N∃z∈Nχg(x, y, z) of cut rank 0. Inversion yields a deduction
⊢α m /∈ N, ∃y∈N∃z∈Nχg(m, y, z)
for each number m. Assume m ≥ 3. By the bounding lemma there are numbers
n, k < F ⋄ε0+α(3m) such that χg(m,n, k) is true. Using Lemma 3.6 we get
g(m) < F ⋄ε0+α(3m) ≤ F
⋄
ε0+α(m
2) ≤ (F ⋄ε0+α)
2(m) ≤ F ⋄ε0+α+1(m),
which shows that g is eventually dominated by F ⋄ε0+α+1. 
Putting pieces together we can deduce the main result of this section:
Theorem 3.10. For any provably total function g of PA + RFN⋄Σ1(PA) there is
a number N such that we have
g(Fε0(n
.− 1)) ≤ Fε0(n) for all n ≥ N.
In particular any provably total function of the theory PA + RFN⋄Σ1(PA) is even-
tually dominated by Fε0 .
Proof. Consider a function g which is provably total in PA + RFN⋄Σ1(PA). The
previous proposition provides an ordinal α < ε0 and a bound N such that we have
g(m) ≤ F ⋄ε0+α(m) for all m ≥ N.
Increasing N if necessary Proposition 3.8 yields
F ⋄ε0+α(Fε0(n
.− 1)) ≤ Fε0 (n) for all n ≥ N.
For n ≥ N we have Fε0(n
.− 1) ≥ n ≥ N and thus
g(Fε0(n
.− 1)) ≤ F ⋄ε0+α(Fε0 (n
.− 1)) ≤ Fε0(n)
and
g(n) ≤ F ⋄ε0+α(n) ≤ F
⋄
ε0+α(Fε0 (n
.− 1)) ≤ Fε0 (n),
as required for Theorem 3.10. 
We remark that the theorem implies
PA+RFN⋄Σ1(PA) 0 RFNΣ1(PA),
because the equivalence RFNΣ1(PA)↔ Fε0 ↓ is provable in Peano Arithmetic (even
in IΣ1, as implied by Proposition 3.1). The analogous result for slow consistency
has been proved in [FRW13] (see also statement (6) in Section 2). In [Fre16] we
investigate the consistency strength of slow reflection (also for reflection formulas
of complexity above Σ1): In particular it is shown that PA+RFN
⋄
Σ1(PA) does not
even prove the consistency of Peano Arithmetic. Further results on slow provability
can be found in work of Henk and Pakhomov [HP16]. To conclude this paper, let
us rephrase our computational analysis in terms of subrecursive degree theory (see
[KSPW12]):
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Corollary 3.11. The honest ε0-elementary degree of F
⋄
ε0
is a non-zero degree
strictly below the degree of Fε0 .
Proof. First we must verify that F ⋄ε0 and Fε0 are honest functions (in the sense
of [KSPW12]). We already know that the two functions are monotone and have
elementary graphs (since they can be defined by ∆0-formulas). It remains to show
that they dominate the function n 7→ 2n: By straightforward computations we see
that F2(n) ≥ 2
n holds for all n. Since ωm+1 →n 2 holds for n ≥ 1 and any m we
obtain
F ⋄ε0(n) = FωF−1ε0 (n)+1
(n) ≥ F2(n) ≥ 2
n for n ≥ 1.
In the separate case n = 0 the inequality F ⋄ε0 (0) ≥ 2
0 is immediate. Similarly one
shows that Fε0(n) ≥ 2
n holds for all n. Now let us argue that the ε0-elementary
degree of F ⋄ε0 is non-zero: In the discussion just after Proposition 3.4 above we have
seen that F ⋄ε0 eventually dominates any provably total function of Peano Arithmetic.
Thus Peano Arithmetic cannot prove the totality of any honest representation of
F ⋄ε0 . In the notation of [KSPW12, Section 10] this means that we do not have
F ⋄ε0 ≤PA 0. Then [KSPW12, Theorem 16] tells us that we cannot have F
⋄
ε0
≤ǫ0E 0.
In other words, the ε0-elementary degree of F
⋄
ε0
is non-zero. Similarly Theorem
3.10 tells us that Fε0 ≤PA F
⋄
ε0
must fail, so that Fε0 ≤ε0E F
⋄
ε0
must fail as well.
Thus F ⋄ε0 and Fε0 do not have the same ε0-elementary degree. On the other hand
it is easy to see F ⋄ε0 ≤ε0E Fε0 : Since F
⋄
ε0
has an elementary graph and is dominated
by Fε0 it is even elementary in Fε0 , by bounded minimization.
We remark that the use of [KSPW12, Theorem 16] is, in some sense, a detour:
Rather than considering provability in Peano Arithmetic one could use the “Gener-
alized Growth Theorem” [KSPW12, Theorem 13] in combination with Proposition
3.8 above. Then, however, one has the technical task to reconcile the different
definitions of the fast-growing hierarchy in our paper and in [KSPW12]. 
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